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Abstract
Peer prediction mechanisms are often adopted to elicit truth-
ful contributions from crowd workers when no ground-truth
verification is available. Recently, mechanisms of this type
have been developed to incentivize effort exertion, in addi-
tion to truthful elicitation. In this paper, we study a sequential
peer prediction problem where a data requester wants to dy-
namically determine the reward level to optimize the trade-off
between the quality of information elicited from workers and
the total expected payment. In this problem, workers have
homogeneous expertise and heterogeneous cost for exerting
effort, both unknown to the requester. We propose a sequen-
tial posted-price mechanism to dynamically learn the optimal
reward level from workers’ contributions and to incentivize
effort exertion and truthful reporting. We show that (1) in
our mechanism, workers exerting effort according to a non-
degenerate threshold policy and then reporting truthfully is an
equilibrium that returns highest utility for every worker, and
(2) The regret of our learning mechanism w.r.t. offering the
optimal reward (price) is upper bounded by O˜(T 3/4) where
T is the learning horizon. We further show the power of our
learning approach when the reports of workers do not neces-
sarily follow the game-theoretic equilibrium.
1 Introduction
Crowdsourcing has arisen as a promising option to facilitate
machine learning via eliciting useful information from
human workers. For example, such a notion has been
widely used for labeling training samples, e.g., Amazon
Mechanical Turk. Despite its simplicity and popularity,
one salient feature or challenge of crowdsourcing is the
lack of evaluation for the collected answers, because
ground-truth labels often are either unavailable or too costly
to obtain. This problem is called information elicitation
without verification (IEWV) (Waggoner and Chen 2014).
A class of mechanisms, collectively called peer pre-
diction, has been developed for the IEWV prob-
lem (Prelec 2004; Miller, Resnick, and Zeckhauser 2005;
Jurca and Faltings 2007; Jurca and Faltings 2009;
Witkowski and Parkes 2012a;
Witkowski and Parkes 2012b;
Radanovic and Faltings 2013). In peer prediction, an
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agent is rewarded according to how his answer compares
with those of his peers and the reward rules are designed
so that everyone truthfully reporting their information is a
game-theoretic equilibrium.
More recent work (Witkowski et al. 2013;
Dasgupta and Ghosh 2013; Shnayder et al. 2016) on
peer prediction concerns effort elicitation, where the goal is
not only to induce truthful report, but also to induce high
quality answers by incentivizing agents to exert effort. In
such work, the mechanism designer is assumed to know
workers’ expertise level and their cost for effort exertion
and designs reward rules to induce optimal effort levels and
truthful reporting at an equilibrium.
This paper also focuses on the effort elicitation of peer
prediction. But different from prior work, our mechanism
designer knows neither workers’ expertise level nor their
cost for effort exertion. We introduce a sequential peer pre-
diction problem, where the mechanism proceeds in rounds
and the mechanism designer wants to learn to set the op-
timal reward level (that balances the amount of effort eli-
cited and the total payment) while observing the elicited an-
swers in previous rounds. There are several challenges to
this problem. First, effort exertion is not observable and no
ground-truth answers are available for evaluating contribu-
tions. Hence, it is not immediately clear what information
the mechanism designer can learn from the observed an-
swers in a sequential mechanism. Second, forward-looking
workers may have incentives to mislead the learning pro-
cess, hoping for better future returns.
The main contributions of this paper are the fol-
lowing: (1) We propose a sequential peer prediction
mechanism by combining ideas from peer prediction
with multi-armed bandit learning (Lai and Robbins 1985;
Auer, Cesa-Bianchi, and Fischer 2002). (2) In this mechan-
ism, workers exerting effort according to a non-degenerate
threshold policy and then reporting truthfully in each round
is an equilibrium that returns highest utility for every worker.
(3) We show that the regret of this mechanism w.r.t. offering
the optimal reward is upper bounded by O˜(T 3/4) where T is
the learning horizon. We also show that under a “mean-field”
assumption, the sequential learning mechanism can be ex-
tended to a setting where workers may not be fully rational.
(4) Our sequential peer prediction mechanism is minimal in
that reported labels are the only information we need from
workers.
In the rest of the paper, we first survey the most re-
lated work in Section 1.1. Section 2 introduces our prob-
lem formulation. We then present a game-theoretic analysis
of worker behavior in a one-stage static setting in Section
3. Based on the equilibrium analysis of the one-stage set-
ting, we propose and analyze a learning mechanism to learn
the optimal bonus level using posted price in Section 4. We
also discuss an extension of our learning mechanism to a
setting where workers may not be fully rational. Section 5
concludes this paper. All omitted details can be found in the
full version of the paper (Liu and Chen 2016b).
1.1 Related work
Eliciting high-quality data from effort-sensitive work-
ers hasn’t been addressed within the literature of peer
prediction until recently. Witkowski et al. [2013] and
Dasgupta and Ghosh [2013] formally introduced costly ef-
fort into models of IEWV. The costs for effort exertion were
assumed to be homogeneous and known and static, one-shot
mechanisms were developed for effort elicitation and truth-
ful reporting. Our setting allows participants to have hetero-
geneous cost of effort exertion drawn from a common un-
known distribution and hence we consider a sequential set-
ting that enables learning over time. Liu and Chen [2016a]
is the closest to this work. It considered the same general
setting and partially resolved the problem of learning the op-
timal reward level sequentially. There are two major differ-
ences however. First, the method developed in Liu and Chen
[2016a] required workers to report their private cost in ad-
dition to their answer, which is arguably undesirable for
practical applications. Our learning mechanism in contrast
is ”minimal” (Segal 2007; Witkowski and Parkes 2013) and
only asks for answers (for tasks) from workers. Second,
the mechanism of Liu and Chen [2016a] was built upon
the output agreement mechanism as the single-round mech-
anism. Output agreement and hence the mechanism of
Liu and Chen [2016a] suffer from potential, simple collu-
sions of workers: colluding by reporting an uninformat-
ive signal will lead to a better equilibrium (higher util-
ity) for workers. By building upon the mechanism of
Dasgupta and Ghosh [2013], which as a one-shot mech-
anism is resistant to such simple collusion, we develop a
collusion-resistant sequential learning mechanism.
Generally speaking, when there is a lack of knowledge
of agents, the design problem needs to incorporate learn-
ing from prior outputs from running the mechanism –
see Chawla, Hartline, and Nekipelov [2014] for specific ex-
amples on learning with auction data. And this particular
topic has also been studied within the domain of crowd-
sourcing. For example, Roth and Schoenebeck [2012] and
Abernethy et al. [2015] consider strategic data acquisition
for estimating the mean and for online learning respectively.
Our problem differs from above in that both agents’ action
(effort exertion) and ground-truth outcomes are unavailable.
2 Problem Formulation
2.1 Formulation and settings
Suppose in our system we have one data requester (or a
mechanism designer), and there are N candidate workers
denoted by C = {1, 2, ..., N}, where N ≥ 4. In all we
haveN+1 interactive agents. The data requester has binary-
answer tasks, with answer space {−1,+1}, that she’d like to
get labels for. The requester assigns tasks to workers.
Label generated by worker i ∈ C comes from a dis-
tribution that depends both on the ground-truth label and
an effort variable ei. Suppose there are two effort levels,
High and Low, that a worker can potentially choose from:
ei ∈ {H,L}. We model the cost c for exerting High ef-
fort for each (worker, task) pair as drawn from a distribu-
tion with c.d.f. F (c) on a bounded support [0, cmax]; while
exerting Low effort incurs no cost. We assume such costs
are drawn in an i.i.d. fashion. Denote worker i’s probab-
ility of observing s′ ∈ {−1,+1} when the ground-truth
label is s ∈ {−1,+1} as pi,ei = Pr(s′ = s|s, ei), un-
der effort level ei. Note with above we have assumed that
the labeling accuracy is symmetric, and is independent of
the ground-truth label s. Further for simplicity of analysis,
we will assume all workers have the same set of pi,H , pi,L,
denoting as pH , pL. With higher effort, the expertise level
is higher: 1 ≥ pH > pL ≥ 0.5 – we also assume the
labeling accuracy is no less than 0.5. The above are com-
mon knowledge among workers, while the mechanism de-
signer doesn’t know the form of F (·); neither does she know
pH , pL. But we assume the mechanism designer knows the
structural information, such as costs are i.i.d., workers are
effort sensitive, and there are two effort levels etc.
The goal of the learner is to design a sequential peer pre-
diction mechanism for effort elicitation via observing con-
tributed data from workers, such that the mechanism will
help the learner converge to making the optimal action (will
be defined later).
2.2 Reward mechanism
Once assigned a task, worker i has a guaranteed base pay-
ment b > 0 for each task he completes. In addition to the
base payment, the worker receives a reward Bi(k) for task
k that he has provided an answer for. The reward is determ-
ined using the mechanism proposed by Dasgupta and Ghosh
[2013], where in this paper, we denote this specific peer pre-
diction mechanism for effort elicitation as (DG13). In this
mechanism, for each (worker, task) pair (i, k), first a ref-
erence worker j 6= i is selected randomly from the set of
workers who are also assigned task k. Suppose any pair
of such workers have been assigned d other distinct tasks
{i1, ..., id} and {j1, ..., jd} respectively. Then the mechan-
ism pays B′i(k) to worker i on task k in the following way:
the payment consists of two terms; one term that rewards
agreement on task k, and another that penalizes on unin-
formative agreement on other tasks:
B′i(k) = 1
(
Li(k) = Lj(k)
)
− Ldi · Ldj − L
d
i · L
d
i , (1)
where we denote reports from worker i on task n as Li(n)
and Ldi :=
∑d
n=1(1 + Li(in))/(2d), L
d
i = 1 − Ldi . Our
bonus rule follows exactly the same idea except that we will
multiply B′i(k) by a constant B ∈ [0, B¯] (which we can
choose): Bi(k) := B · B′i(k).
Task assignment: We’d like all workers to work on the
same number of tasks, all tasks are assigned to the same
number of workers and any pair of workers have distinct
tasks. In particular, each worker is assigned M > 1 tasks –
denote the set of tasks assigned to worker i as Ti : |Ti| = M .
This is to simplify the computation of workers’ utility and
payment functions. Each task is assigned to at least two
workers. For any pair of workers who has been assigned a
common task, they have at least 1 ≤ d < M distinct tasks.
These are to ensure that the (DG13) mechanism is applic-
able. We also set the number of assignments for each task to
be the same – denote this number as 1 ≤ K < N , so that
when we evaluate the accuracy of aggregated labels later, all
tasks receive the same level of accuracy. But note we do not
assign all tasks to all workers, i.e., K 6= N . Suppose each
assigned task k appears in D ≤ d tasks’ distinct set for each
worker. The described assignment can be achieved by as-
signing N different tasks in each round. For more details on
assignments please refer to our full version.
2.3 Worker model
After receiving each task k, worker i first realizes the cost
ci(k) for exerting High effort. Then worker i decides his ef-
fort level ei(k) ∈ {H,L} and observes a signal Li(k) (label
of the task). Worker i can decide either to truthfully report
his observation ri(k) = 1 (denote by ri(k) the decision vari-
able on reporting) or to revert the answer ri(k) = 0:
Lri (k) =
{
Li(k), if ri(k) = 1
−Li(k), if ri(k) = 0
Workers are utility maximizers. Denote the utility func-
tion at each time (or step) for each worker as ui, which is
assumed to have the following form (payment − cost):
ui = Mb+
∑
k∈Ti
Bi(k)−
∑
k∈Ti
ci(k), ∀i.
2.4 Data requester model
After collecting labels for each task, the data requester will
aggregate labels via majority voting. Denote workers who
labeled task k aswk(1), ..., wk(K). Then the aggregate label
for k is given by
LA(k) = 1
( K∑
n=1
Lrwk(n)(k)/K > 0
)
· 2− 1.
The data requester’s objective is to find a bonus level B
(as in Bi(k)) that balances the accuracy of labels collected
from workers, and the total payment. Denote requester’s ob-
jective function at each step as U(B) (assigning N tasks):
U(B) :=
N∑
k=1
[
Pr[LA(k) = L(k)]− η
K∑
n=1
E[Bwk(n)(k)]
]
,
where L(k) denotes the true label of task k, and η > 0 is a
weighting constant balancing the two terms in the objective.
Since we have assumed that all tasks have been assigned
the same number of workers, and workers are homogen-
eous in their labeling accuracy and cost (i.i.d.), we know all
tasks enjoy the same probability of having a correct label (a-
priori). We denote this probability as P(B) := Pr[LA(k) =
L(k)], ∀k. Further as workers do not receive payment when
a task is not assigned to him, U(B) can be simplified (and
normalized 1) to the following form:
U(B) = P(B)− η
N
∑
i∈C
N∑
k=1
E[Bi(k)], (2)
Suppose there exists a maximizer B∗ = argmaxBU(B) .
2.5 Sequential learning setting
Suppose our sequential learning algorithm goes for T stages.
At each stage t = 1, ..., T , learner assigns a certain number
of tasks Mi(t) to a set of selected workers i ∈ S(t)2. The
learner offers a bonus bundle Bi,t to each worker i ∈ S(t)
(the bonus constant in reward mechanism). The regret of of-
fering {Bi,t}i,t w.r.t. B∗ is defined as follows:
R(T ) = T · U(B∗)−
T∑
t=1
∑
i∈S(t)
Mi(t) · E[U(Bi,t)]∑
j∈S(t)Mj(t)
. (3)
Note we normalize E[U(Bi,t)] using the number of assign-
ments – intuitively the more the requester assigned with
a wrong price, the more regret will be incurred. The goal
of the data requester is to design an algorithm such that
R(T ) = o(T ). We can also define R(T ) as being un-
normalized, which will add a constant (bounded number of
assignments at each step) in front of our results later.
3 One stage game-theoretic analysis
From the data requester’s perspective, we need to first under-
stand workers’ actions towards effort exertion and report-
ing under different bonus levels, in order to figure out the
optimal B∗. We start with the case that the data requester
knows the cost distribution, and we characterize the equilib-
ria for effort exertion and reporting, i.e. (ei, ri), on work-
ers’ side. Note ei, ri are both vectors defined over all tasks
– this is a simplification of notation as workers do not re-
ceive all tasks. We are safe as if task k is not assigned to
i, worker i does not make decisions on (ei(k), ri(k)). We
define Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) in our context as
follows:
Definition 1. We say {(e∗i , r∗i )}i∈C is a BNE if ∀j, (ej, rj):
E[uj |{(e∗i , r∗i )}i∈C ] ≥ E[uj |{(e∗i , r∗i )}i6=j , (ej, rj)] .
In this paper, we restrict our attention to symmetric BNE.
For each assigned task, we have a Bayesian game among
workers in C: a worker’s decision on effort exertion is a
1which does not affect optimizing the utility function.
2For details please refer to our algorithm.
function of ci, ei(ci) : [0, cmax]M → {H,L}M , which spe-
cifies the effort levels for worker i when his realized cost
is ci and ri(ei) : {0, 1}M → {0, 1}M gives the reporting
strategy for the chosen effort level. We focus on threshold
policies: that is, there is a threshold c∗ such that ei(k) = H
for all ci(k) ≤ c∗ and ei(k) = L otherwise. In fact, play-
ers must play a threshold strategy for effort exertion at any
symmetric BNE: workers’ outputs do not depend on ci(k)
and worker i’s chance of getting a bonus will not change
when he has a cost c′i(k) < ci(k); so a worker will choose
to exert effort, if it is a better move for an even higher cost.
We will use (c∗, ri(k)) to denote this threshold (c∗) strategy
for workers. Denote ri(·) ≡ 1 the reporting strategy that
ri(H) = ri(L) = 1, i.e. reporting truthfully regardless of
the choice of effort.
Theorem 2. When pL > 0.5 and F (c) is concave, there
exists a unique threshold c∗(B) > 0 for B > 0 such that
(c∗(B), 1) is a symmetric BNE for all workers on all tasks.
Other equilibrias: The above threshold policy is unique
only in non-degenerate effort exertion (c∗ > 0). There exist
other equilibria. We summarize them here:
• Un-informative equilibrium: Colluding by always report-
ing the same answer to all tasks is an equilibrium. Simil-
arly as mentioned in (Dasgupta and Ghosh 2013), when
colluding (pure or mixed strategies) the bonus index
defined in Eqn. (1) reduces to 0 for each worker, which
leads to a worse equilibrium.
• Low effort: When pL = 1/2, c∗ = 0, i.e., no effor exertion
(followed by either truthful or untruthful reporting) is also
an equilibrium: when no one else is exerting effort, each
worker’s answer will be compared to a random guess. So
there would be no incentive for effort exertion.
• Permutation: Exerting the same amount of effort and then
reverting the reports (ri ≡ 0) is also an equilibrium.
But we would like to note that though there may exist mul-
tiple equilibria, all others lead to strictly less utility for each
worker at equilibrium compared to the threshold equilibrium
with c∗ > 0 followed by truthful reporting, except for the
permutation equilibria, which gives the same expected util-
ity to workers.
Solve for optimal B∗: After characterizing the equilibria
c∗ on effort exertion as a function of B, we can compute
P(B) and E[Bi(k)] for each reward level B. Then solving
for the optimal reward level becomes a programming prob-
lem in B, which can be solved efficiently when certain prop-
erties, e.g. convexity, can be established for U(·).
4 Sequential Peer Prediction
In this section we propose an adaptive learning mech-
anism to learn to converge to the optimal or nearly op-
timal reward level. As mentioned earlier, a recent work
(Liu and Chen 2016a) attempted to resolve this challenge.
But besides the output labels, workers are also required to
report the private costs, in which sense the proposed learning
mechanism is not “minimal”. We try to remove this require-
ment by learning only through the label information reported
by the workers. In this section, we assume the requirements
for Theorem 2 hold, and workers will follow an equilibrium
that returns the highest utility.
4.1 Challenges
In designing the mechanism, we face two main challenges.
The first challenge is on the learning part. In order to select
the best B∗, we need to compute U(B), ∀B, which can be
computed as a function of B and p¯(B), the probability of la-
beling accurately when B is offered and the threshold policy
c∗(B) is adopted by workers:
p¯(B) := F (c∗(B))pH + [1− F (c∗(B))]pL. (4)
The dependency on B is straight-forward. For p¯(B), e.g.
when using Chernoff bound for approximating P(B):
P(B) = Pr
[∑
i 1(worker i is correct)
M
≥ 0.5
]
≥ 1− exp(−2(p¯(B)− 0.5)2M),
it is clear P(B) is a function of p¯(B). In fact both E[Bi(k)]
and P(B) are functions of p¯(B), so is U(·). For details,
please see Appendix of (Liu and Chen 2016b). The question
pings down to learn p¯(B). Since we do not have the ground-
truth labels, we have no way to directly evaluate p¯(B) via
checking workers’ answers. Also since we do not elicit re-
ports on private costs, we are un-able to estimate the amount
of induced effort for each reward level.
The second challenge we have is that when workers are
returning and participating in a/an sequential/adaptive learn-
ing mechanism, they have incentives to mislead the learn-
ing process by deviating from the one-shot BNE strategy for
a task, so to create untruthful samples (and then collected
by learner), which will lead the learner into believing that
inducing certain amount of effort requires a much higher
reward level. The cost-reporting mechanism described in
(Liu and Chen 2016a) proposes a method to deter such a de-
viation by eliminating workers who over-reported from re-
ceiving potentially higher bonus. We will describe a two-
fold cross validation approach to decouple such incentives,
which aims to remove the requirement of reporting addi-
tional information.
Learning w/o ground-truth The following observation
inspires our method for learning without ground-truth. For
each bonus level B, we can estimate p¯(B) (at equilibrium)
through the following experiments: the probability of ob-
serving a pair of matching answers for any pair of workers
i, j (denoted by pm(B) for each bonus level B) on equilib-
rium can be written as follows:
pm(B) = p¯
2(B)︸ ︷︷ ︸
match on correct label
+ (1 − p¯(B))2︸ ︷︷ ︸
match on wrong label
. (5)
The above matching formula forms a quadratic equa-
tion of p¯(B). From Eqn. (4) we know p¯(B) ≥
0.5, ∀B, when pH , pL ≥ 0.5. Then the only solution to
the matching Eqn. (5) that is larger than 0.5 is
p¯(B) = 1/2 +
√
2pm(B)− 1/2.
Above solution is well defined, as from Eqn. (5) we can
also deduce that pm(B) ≥ 1/2. Therefore though we can-
not evaluate each worker’s labeling accuracy directly, we
can make such an inference using the matching probability,
which is indeed observable.
Decoupling incentives via cross validation To solve the
incentive issue, we propose the following cross validation
approach (illustrated in Fig. 1). First the entire crowd C is
separated into two groups G1, G−1 uniformly random, but
with equal size (when N is even) or their sizes differ by at
most 1 (when N is odd). Suppose we have at least N ≥ 4.
Denote worker i’s group ID as g(i) ∈ {−1, 1}. Then we
have |G1|, |G−1| ≥ 2. For our learning algorithm, only the
data/samples collected from group −g(i) will be used to
reward any worker i in group g(i). Secondly when select-
ing reference worker for comparing answers for mechanism
(DG13), we select from the same group g(i).
Figure 1: Illustration of our mechanism.
4.2 Mechanism
We would like to treat each bonus level as an “arm” (as in
standard MAB context) to explore with. Since we have a
continuous space of bonus level B, we separate the support
of bonus level B ([0, B¯]) into finite intervals. Then we treat
each bonus interval as an arm. Our goal is to select the best
one of them, and bound the performance in such a selection.
We set up ⌈T z⌉ arms as follows: chooses a 0 < z < 1,
separate [0, B¯] into Na = ⌈T z⌉ uniform intervals:
[0, B¯/Na], ..., [(k−1)B¯/Na, kB¯/Na], ...., [(Na−1)B¯/Na, B¯]
For each interval we take its right end point as the bonus
level to offer:Bk = kB¯/Na.Denote by p˜gm,t(Bk) the estim-
ated matching probability for agents in group g under bonus
level Bk, and p˜gt (Bk)s the estimated p¯(Bk) for group g, at
stage t; and we use U˜p˜(B) to denote the estimated utility
function when using a noisy p¯(B) (p˜), instead of the true
ones. We present Mechanism 1.3
Note since we assign the same number of tasks to each
labeler at all stages, we have the regret defined in Eqn. (3)
become equivalent with the following form:
R(T ) =
T∑
t=1
|
∑
g∈{1,−1}
ωg(t) · E[U(B∗g,t)]− U(B∗))|,
where when t is in exploration stages ωg(t) ≡ 1/2, other-
wise ωg(t) := |Gg|/N.
3We assume we know pL or a non-trivial lower bound on pL >
0.5.
Mechanism 1 (SPP PostPrice)
Initialization: t = 1. D(t) := tθ log t, 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1. Ex-
plore each bonus level Bk once and update p˜gm,t(Bk) (for
details please refer to the exploration phases), and set the
number of explorations as ni(t) = 1.
for t = 1 to T do
Set E(t) := {i : ni(t) < D(t)}.
if E(t) 6= ∅ then
Exploration: randomly pick Bk, k ∈ E(t) to offer.
Follow subroutine (Explore Crowd).
else
Exploitation: S(t) = C. Offer B∗g,t to i ∈ Gg:
B∗g,t = argmaxBk,k=1,2,...,⌈T z⌉U˜p˜gt (Bk)(Bk),
Follow (DG13) for workers in each group Gg .
end if
end for
Mechanism 2 (Explore Crowd)
At exploration phases,
1: Randomly select two workers Sg(t) = {ig(t), jg(t)}
from each group Gg; S(t) := ∪gSg(t).
2: Assign 1 common and d distinct tasks to each Sg(t).
3: Denote by Ek(t) the set of time steps the algorithm
enters exploration and offered price Bk by time t. Es-
timate the probability of matching p˜gm,t(Bk) for each
crowd Gg, g ∈ {−1, 1} by averaging:
p˜gm,t(Bk) =
∑
t′∈Ek(t)
1(Li−g(t′)(t′) = Lj−g(t′)(t′)),
and reset p˜gm,t(Bk) to max{p˜gm,t(Bk), 1/2}. Li(t′) de-
notes the label for the common task at time t′.
4: Compute p˜gt (Bk) (estimate for p¯(Bk) at time t):
p˜gt (Bk) = 1/2 +
√
2p˜gm,t(Bk)− 1/2.
Reset p˜gt (Bk) := max{p˜gt (Bk), pL}.
4.3 Equilibrium analysis: workers’ side
Denote a worker’s action profile at step t as ai(t) :=
(ei(t), ri(t)). We adopt BNE as our solution concept:
Definition 3. A set of reporting strategy {a˜i :=
{a˜i(t)}t=1,...,T}i∈C is a BNE if for any i, ∀a˜′i 6= a˜i we have∑
t
E[ max
ei(t),ri(t)
ui(a˜i, a˜−i)|a˜i(1 : t− 1), a˜−i(1 : t− 1)]
≥
∑
t
E[ max
ei(t),ri(t)
ui(a˜
′
i, a˜−i)|a˜′i(1 : t− 1), a˜−i(1 : t− 1)] .
We first characterize the equilibrium strategy for workers’
effort exertion and reporting with (SPP PostPrice).
Lemma 4. At a symmetric BNE, the strategy for workers
can be decoupled into a composition of myopic equilibrium
strategies, that is ei(t) = c∗(B∗,g(i)(t)), combined with
ri(t) ≡ 1, ∀i, t.
Proof. W.l.o.g., consider worker i in G1. We are going to
reason that deviating from one step BNE strategy for effort
exertion is non-profitable for worker i, when other players
are following the equilibria. Since the one stage equilibrium
strategy maximizes the utility at current stage, and it does
not affect the past utilities that have been already collec-
ted, the potential gain by deviating comes from the future
gains in utilities in: (1) the offered bonus level (2) match-
ing probability from other peers. For the bonus level offered
to worker i, it will only be computed using observed data
from workers in G−1 at exploration phases. Note for our
online learning process, the exploration phases only depend
on the pre-defined parameter D(t), which does not depend
on worker i’s data (deterministic exploration). Similarly for
all other workers j ∈ G1 (reference workers), their future
utility gain is not affected by worker i’s data. Therefore an
unilateral deviation from worker i will not affect the match-
ing probability from other peers. So no deviation is profit-
able.
Again consider colluding workers. Potentially when
offered a certain bonus level, workers can collude by not
exerting effort regardless of their cost realization, so to mis-
lead the learner into believing that in order to incentivize cer-
tain amount of effort, a much higher bonus level is needed.4
There potentially exist infinitely many colluding strategies
for workers to game against a sequential learning algorithm.
We focus on the following easy-to-coordinate (for workers),
yet powerful strategy (Collude Learn):
Definition 5 (Collude Learn). Workers collude by
agreeing to exert effort when the offered bonus level B∗g(i),t
satisfiesB∗g(i),t ≥ B(ci,t(k))+∇B, where ci,t(k) is the cost
for workers i to exert effort for task k at time t. ∇B > 0 is
a collusion constant.
In doing so workers mislead the learner into believing that
a higher bonus (differs by ∇B) is needed to induce certain
effort. The next lemma establishes the collusion-proofness:
Lemma 6. Colluding in (SPP PostPrice) via
(Collude Learn) is not an equilibrium.
In fact the reasoning for removing all symmetric collud-
ing equilibria is similar – regardless of how others collude
on effort exertion, when a worker’s realized cost is small
enough, he will deviate.
4.4 Performance of (SPP PostPrice)
We impose the following assumptions 5:
Assumption 7. U(·) is Lipschitz in both p¯(B) and B:
|U˜p˜(B˜)− U(B)| ≤ L1|p˜(B˜)− p¯(B˜)|+ L2|B˜ −B|,
L1, L2 > 0 are the Lipschitz constants.
4This is similar to the colluding strategy that contributes unin-
formative signals we studied in Section 3.
5Please refer to our full version for justification.
We have the following theorem:
Theorem 8. The regret of (SPP PostPrice) is:
R(T ) ≤O(⌈T θ+z logT ⌉) + L1C(θ)√
2pL − 1T
1−θ/2
+ L2C(z)B¯T
1−z + const.
0 < θ, z < 1 are tunable parameters. C(θ), C(z) > 0 are
constants. The optimal regret is R(T ) ≤ O˜(T 3/4) when set-
ting z = 1/4, θ = 1/2.
Proof. (Sketch) First notice by triangular inequality we
know R(T ) ≤ ∑g∈{1,−1} ωgRg(T ), i.e., the total regret
is upper bounded by the weighted sum of each group’s re-
gret. Since the two learning processes for the two groups
G1, G−1 parallel each other, we omit the g super- or sub-
script. We analyze for the regret incurred at the exploration
and exploitation stages respectively. For exploitation regret,
we first characterize the estimation error for estimating each
U(Bk). First by mean value theorem we can show:
|p¯(Bk)− p˜t(Bk)| ≤ 1
2
√
2pL − 1 |pm(Bk)− p˜m,t(Bk)|.
At time t, an exploitation phase, there are D(t) number of
samples guaranteed; so the estimation p˜m,t(Bk) satisfies:
Pr[|pm(Bk) − p˜m,t(Bk)| ≥ 1tθ/2 ] ≤ 2t2 . Then w.h.p., we
have established that |p¯(Bk) − p˜t(Bk)| ≤ t−θ/22√2pL−1 . Fur-
ther by Lipschitz condition we know |U˜(Bk) − U(Bk)| ≤
L1·t−θ/2
2
√
2pL−1 . For any B that falls in the same interval as Bk we
know: |U(B)− U(Bk)| ≤ L2|B −Bk| ≤ L2B¯T−z.
Denote by B∗t = argmaxBk,k=1,2,...,⌈T z⌉U˜t(Bk) , i.e., B∗t
is the estimated optimal bonus level at time t – at any time t,
by searching through all arm and we can find the one maxim-
izes the utility function from the empirically estimated func-
tion the learner currently has. Combine above arguments, we
can prove U(B∗) − U(B∗t ) ≤ L1·t
−θ/2
2
√
2pL−1 + L2B¯T
−z. Then
the exploration regret can be bounded as
T∑
t=1
(
L1 · t−θ/2
2
√
2pL − 1 + L2B¯T
−z) +O(
T∑
t=1
2
t2
)
≤ L1 · C(θ)
2
√
2pL − 1T
1−θ/2 + L2 · C(z)B¯T 1−z + const.
where we have used the fact that for any 0 < α < 1, there
exists a constant C(α) such that
∑T
t=1
1
tα ≤ C(α)T 1−α .
The total number of explorations are (T θ log T number of
explorations needed for each of the ⌈T z⌉ arms): ⌈T z⌉ ·
T θ logT = ⌈T θ+z logT ⌉ . Sum over we finish the proof.
4.5 Beyond game theoretical model
So far we have modeled the workers as being fully rational,
and the reports as coming from game theoretical responses.
Consider the case workers’ responses do not necessarily fol-
low a game (or arguably no one is fully rational). Instead we
assume each worker has a labeling accuracy pi(B) for dif-
ferent B, where pi(B) can come from different models, be-
ing game theory driven, behavioral model driven or decision
theory driven, and can be different for different workers.
Challenges and a mean filed approach: With this model,
we can again write U(B) as a function of {pi(B)}i
and B. In order to select B∗, again we need to learn
pi(B). We re-adopt the bandit model we described earlier,
and estimate pi(B)s via observing the matching prob-
ability between worker i and a randomly selected ref-
erence worker j: For each i, B we define p¯−i(B) :=∑
j∈Gg(i)\i pj(B)/|Gg(i)\i|, and we have
pim(B) = pi(B)p¯−i(B) + (1− pi(B))(1 − p¯−i(B)), (6)
where pim(B) is the probability of observing a matching for
worker i, when a random reference worker is drawn (uni-
formly) from his group. The above forms a system of quad-
ratic equations in {pi(B)}i when {pim(B)}is are known.
We then need to solve a perturbed quadratic equations for
{pi(B)}i, with {pim(B)}is being estimated via observations
(Step 3 of (Explore Crowd)). The following challenges
arise for analysis: (1) it is hard to tell whether the solution
for above quadratic equations is unique or not. (2) Solving
a set of perturbed (error in estimating {pim(B)}is) quadratic
equations for each B incurs heavy computations.6
Instead, by observing the availability of relatively large
and diverse population of crowd workers, we make the fol-
lowing mean filed assumption:
Assumption 9. For any worker i, p¯−i(B) ≡ p¯g(i)(B) .
That is one particular worker’s expertise level does not
affect the crowd’s mean. This is not a entirely unreasonable
assumption to make, as the candidate pool of crowd workers
is generally large. With above pim(B) then becomes
pim(B) = pi(B)p¯g(i)(B) + (1− pi(B))(1 − p¯g(i)(B)).
Averaging over i ∈ Gg(i) we have:∑
i∈Gg(i) p
i
m(B)/|Gg(i)| = p¯2g(i)(B) + (1 − p¯g(i)(B))2,
which is very similar to the matching equation we derived
earlier on. Again we can solve for p¯g(i)(B) as a function of∑
i∈Gg(i) p
i
m(B)/|Gg(i)|. Plugging p¯g(i)(B) back into Eqn.
(6), we obtain an estimate of pi(B) as follows:
pi(B) = (p
i
m(B) + p¯g(i)(B)− 1)/(2p¯g(i)(B)− 1).
Similar regret can be obtained – the difference only
lies in estimating pi(Bk)s. Details can be found in
(Liu and Chen 2016b).
5 Conclusion
We studied the sequential peer prediction mechanism for
eliciting effort using posted price. We improve over status
quo towards making the peer prediction mechanism for ef-
fort elicitation more practical: (1) we propose a posted-price
6We do not claim this is impossible to do. Rather, analyzing the
output from such a system of perturbed quadratic equations merits
a further study.
and “minimal” sequential peer prediction mechanism with
bounded regret. The mechanism does not require workers to
report additional information, except their answers for as-
signed tasks. Further we show our learning results can gen-
eralize to the case when workers may not necessarily be fully
rational, under a mean-filed assumption. (2) Workers exert-
ing effort according to an informative threshold strategy and
reporting truthfully is an equilibria that returns highest util-
ity.
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Appendix
A Randomized task assignment
We explain on why we need a well structured random task assignment. First we make sure for each task, it has been assigned
at least to two workers, so each of the assignment can serve as a peer evaluation for the other. Secondly for any pair of workers
that share the same task, they also need to have distinct tasks, which is motivated by the mechanism (DG13).
A reader may notice that by simply assigning each task to all worker both of above conditions will be satisfied satisfied. (For
example, assign 4 tasks {1, 2, 3, 4} to all 4 workers, and when distinct tasks are needed for worker 1 and 2, we can compute
using only task 3 and 4 for each worker respectively.) But instead we will make our assignment process random, which will help
exclude the possibility of more complicated collusion strategies (e.g. such as colluding on subset of tasks but not on the rest,
see the example below), especially when also considering we can randomly shuffle labels (or IDs) of both workers and tasks.
Therefore in this paper we only consider one type of collusion, that is if workers decide to contribute uninformative signals,
they will report the same labels for all tasks.
Example on more sophisticated collusion: Suppose workers are assigned the same set of tasks with the same ID. And for
simplicity we assume there are even number of tasks. Workers agree on the IDs of tasks, and they will agree on reporting -1 for
odd number ID tasks, and +1 for even IDs. Then
Bi(k) = 1(Li(k) = Lj(k))− Ldi · Ldj − L
d
i · L
d
i
= 1− 1
2
· 1
2
− 1
2
· 1
2
=
1
2
,
which is the maximum score that can be achieved as
1(Li(k) = Lj(k)) ≤ 1,
Ldi · Ldj + L
d
i · L
d
i ≥ 1/2.
To see this, denote by x := Ldi , y := Ldj – we know 0 ≤ x, y ≤ 1. The following holds:
xy + (1− x)(1 − y) ≤ (x2 + y2)/2 + ((1− x)2 + (1− y)2)/2 = 2x
2 − 2x+ 1
2
+
2y2 − 2y + 1
2
≥ 1/2.
A feasible assignment: Now we demonstrate that such an assignment that meets all requirements can be achieved. For
example, suppose we have 4 workers, set M = 2, d = 1,K = 2 and we assign 4 tasks {1, 2, 3, 4} each time as follows:
Worker 1: {1, 2}, Worker 2: {1, 3}, Worker 3: {2, 4}, Worker 4: {3, 4}
Not hard to verify the above assignment satisfies all constraints we enforced. More generally when we have N workers, we can
prepare N tasks to assign for each time. Again set M = 2, d = 1,K = 2. Denote the tasks received by worker i as ti(1), ti(2).
Then the assignment can be adaptively decided as follows:
t1(1) =1, t1(2) = 2, t2(1) = 1, t2(2) = 3,
ti(1) =ti−2(2), ti(2) = min{ti−1(2) + 1, N}, ∀i > 2 .
It is easy to verify the above assignment rule satisfies our requirements: each tasks is assigned at least twice; workers receiving
the same task also receive different tasks; all tasks are assigned the same number of times; not all tasks are assigned to all
workers.
B Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. Denote by P+1,P−1 the priors for labels, and the probability of observing label +1 and -1 of each worker i under effort
level ei as
p+,ei := Pr[Li = +1|ei] = P+pei + P−(1− pei),
and p−,ei := 1− p+,ei . W.l.o.g. consider task k of worker i (when task k is indeed assigned to worker i). Exerting effort or not
on task k will affect ui in two ways:
First on E[Bi(k)]: notice the decision on k does not affect E[Ldi · Ldj ]. For E[1(Li(k) = Lj(k))], consider the fact that every
other player is following the threshold policy that ej(k) = H if cj(k) ≤ c∗, and truthfully reporting. Then
E[pej(k)] = F (c
∗)pH + (1− F (c∗))(1 − pL),
E[p+,ej(k)] = F (c
∗)p+,H + (1− F (c∗))p+,L.
From which we have the utility difference between exerting and not exerting effort becomes:
E[Bi(k)|ei = H ]− E[Bi(k)|ei = L]
=E[pHpej(k) + (1− pH)(1 − pej(k))]
− E[pLpej(k) + (1 − pL)(1 − pej(k))]
=(pH − pL)(2E[pej(k)]− 1),
where
E[pej(k)] = F (c
∗)pH + (1− F (c∗))pL.
Now consider the effect of ei(k) on E[Bi(k′)], k′ 6= k. Suppose after the randomized assignment, k appears in D ≤ M − 1
other tasks’ distinct set. Denote the set as D. For k′ ∈ D, ei(k) affects the “penalty term”: first we know by independence that
E[Ldi · Ldj ] = E[Ldi ] · E[Ldj ] .
Then
E[Ldi · Ldj |ei(k) = H ]− E[Ldi · Ldj |ei(k) = L]
=E[Ldj ]
(
E[Ldi |ei(k) = H ]− E[Ldi |ei(k) = L]
)
=E[p+,ej ]
p+,H − p+,L
d
.
And similarly
E[L
d
i · L
d
j |ei(k) = H ]− E[L
d
i · L
d
j |ei(k) = L] = (1− E[p+,ej ])
p+,L − p+,H
d
Summarize above difference we know:
E[ui|ei(k) = H ]− E[ui|ei(k) = L] = V1 · F (c∗) + V2,
where
V1 := 2(pH − pL)2[1 − D
d
(P+ − P−)2]
V2 := (2pL − 1)[1− D
d
(P+ − P−)2](1− 2P−)2 .
The equilibrium equation establishes itself when the above equals to the cost c∗: (after re-arrange)
B[V1 · F (c∗) + V2] = c∗. (7)
When D is chosen such that D ≤ d we know V1, V2 > 0 (as P+,P− > 0). We claim when F (·) is concave, there exists a
unique solution if pL > 0.5: first LHS(c∗ = 0) > RHS(c∗ = 0), and when
B[V1 · F (c∗ = c¯) + V2] ≤ cmax,
we have LHS of Eqn. (7) and the RHS intersects exactly once. So this unique intersecting point c∗ ≤ cmax is the unique solution
to Eqn. (7), and o.w., we have c∗ ≡ cmax, that is B is large enough so that exerting effort is always the best action to take.
Also reporting by reverting the answer, i.e., ri = 0, the probability of matching the true label becomes 1 − pH < pL, which
leads to even less utility. So deviating from truthfully reporting is not profitable.
C Proof of Lemma 6
Proof. This lemma is due to the fact that if everyone else is colluding to mis-lead the learner into believing a wrong price,
a particular worker has no incentive to also do so: first his reported data will not affect his own price in the future. And as a
rational worker, he should not care about the prices received by others. Due to the index rule we adopted, workers can do better
than colluding: deviating from colluding to not exert effort possibly increases his current stage payment, when pL > 0.5, and
when cost ci is small enough:
E[Bi(k)|ei = H ]− E[Bi(k)|ei = L]
= (pH − pL)(2E[pej(k)]− 1),
= (pH − pL)(2pL − 1) > 0 .
D Lipschitz assumption on U(B)
Detailed argument for establishing the Lipschitz conditions can be similarly found in (Liu and Chen 2016a). We briefly mention
it here: when we use lower bound approximation for P(B) we have
U(B) = 1− exp(−2(p¯(B)− 0.5)2M)− η ·B ·M
[
P−(2p¯(B)− 1)(P+(2p¯(B)− 1) + 1)
]
.
The second part P−(2p¯(B)−1)(P+(2p¯(B)−1)+1) is obtained by computing E[Bi(k)]. It is easy to see both exp(−2(p¯(B)−
0.5)2N) and the second quadratic terms are Lipschitz in p¯(B). The rest remains to prove is that p¯(B) is also Lipschitz in B, as
the composition of bounded Lipschitz functions are also Lipschitz. Since
p¯(B) := F (c∗(B))pH + [1− F (c∗(B))]pL = (pH − pL)F (c∗(B)) + pL,
and as F (·) is concave and Lipschitz in c, we only need to prove that c∗(B) is Lipschitz in B. The proof can be similarly estab-
lished as Lemma 13.2 in (Liu and Chen 2016a) with similar assumptions, based on the equilibrium equation we characterized
in the proof of Theorem 2.
E Proof of Theorem 8
Proof. First notice by triangle inequality we know
R(T ) =
T∑
t=1
|
∑
g∈{1,−1}
ωg · E[U(B∗g,t)]− U(B∗)|
≤
∑
g∈{1,−1}
ωg
T∑
t=1
|E[U(B∗g,t)]− U(B∗)|
:=
∑
g∈{1,−1}
ωgRg(T ),
i.e., the total regret is upper bounded by the weighted sum of each crowd’s regret. Since the two learning processes for the two
groupsG1, G−1 parallel each other, we omit the g super- or sub-script: we analyze the learning performance for each sub-group
and the ones for the other one follows exactly the same.
We separate the regret analysis into exploration regret and exploitation regret, that is the regret incurred at the exploration
and exploitation stages respectively. We start with analyzing the exploitation regret. In order to characterize the exploitation
regret, we need to characterize the estimation error for estimating each U(Bk). First by mean value theorem we know ∃p ∈
[min{pm(Bk), p˜m,t(Bk)},max{pm(Bk), p˜m,t(Bk)}]
|p¯(Bk)− p˜t(Bk)| = |
√
2pm(Bk)− 1−
√
2p˜m,t(Bk)|
2
=
1
2
√
1− 2(1− p) |pm(Bk)− p˜m,t(Bk)|,
≤ 1
2
√
2pL − 1 |pm(Bk)− p˜m,t(Bk)|.
The inequality comes from the fact p ≥ min{pm(Bk), p˜m,t(Bk)} ≥ pL > 0.5, so the bound is well defined. 7 Now consider
the estimation error in pm(Bk). At time t, an exploitation phase, there are D(t) number of exploration/samples guaranteed, so
the estimation for pm(Bk) at time t satisfies:
Pr
[
|pm(Bk)− p˜m,t(Bk)| ≥ 1
tθ/2
]
≤ 2exp(−2( 1
tθ/2
)2tθ log t) =
2
t2
.
Then w.h.p., we have established that
|p¯(Bk)− p˜t(Bk)| ≤ t
−θ/2
2
√
2pL − 1 .
By Lipschitz condition we know
|U˜(Bk)− U(Bk)| ≤ L1 · t
−θ/2
2
√
2pL − 1 .
For any B that falls in the same interval as Bk we know:
|U(B)− U(Bk)| ≤ L2|B −Bk| ≤ L2B¯T−z.
Combine above arguments, we know for any B, we have the estimated utility function U˜(Bk) (the same interval as B) satisfy
the follows
|U˜(Bk)− U(B)| ≤ L1 · t
−θ/2
2
√
2pL − 1 + L2B¯T
−z.
Denote by B∗t = argmaxBk,k=1,2,...,⌈T z⌉U˜t(Bk) , i.e., B∗t is the estimated optimal bonus level at time t – at any time t, by
searching through all arm and we can find the one maximizes the utility function from the empirically estimated function the
learner currently has. Then
U(B∗t )− U(B∗)
≥ U˜(B∗t )−
L1 · t−θ/2
2
√
2pL − 1 − U(B
∗)
≥ U˜(B∗k)− U(B∗)−
L1 · t−θ/2
2
√
2pL − 1
≥ − L1 · t
−θ/2
2
√
2pL − 1 − L2B¯T
−z ,
7In the learning section we simply consider the case pL > 0.5.
where B∗k is the bonus level that is in the same interval as B∗. Combine with the fact U(B˜∗) ≤ U(B) we have
U(B∗)− U(B∗t ) ≤
L1 · t−θ/2
2
√
2pL − 1 + L2B¯T
−z.
Then the regret for exploration phases can be bounded as
T∑
t=1
(
L1 · t−θ/2
2
√
2pL − 1 + L2B¯T
−z) +O(
T∑
t=1
2
t2
) ≤ L1 · C(θ)
2
√
2pL − 1T
1−θ/2 + L2 · C(z)B¯T 1−z + const.
where we have used the fact that for any 0 < α < 1, there exists a constant C(α) such that
∑T
t=1
1
tα ≤ C(α)T 1−α . The total
number of explorations are (T θ log T number of explorations needed for each of the ⌈T z⌉ arms)
⌈T z⌉ · T θ logT = ⌈T θ+z log T ⌉ .
Then the total accumulated regret incurred (exploration regret + exploitation regret) is bounded by
R(T ) ≤ |maxU −minU| · ⌈T θ+z logT ⌉+ L1C(θ)√
2pL − 1T
1−θ/2 + L2C(z)B¯T 1−z + const.
The above regret achieves the optimal order when the three exponent term matches each other:
θ + z = 1− θ/2, 1− θ/2 = 1− z,
which leads to the solution of z = 1/4, θ = 1/2, which further results to the optimal order of regret T 3/4.
E.1 The assumption that pL > 0.5
The assumption that pL > 0.5 is somewhat bothering. There are two places this assumption is needed. The first place is in
proving the collusion proof for our learning mechanism (Lemma 6). The reason for this particular assumption is that when pL =
0.5, the matching probability becomes independent of worker i’s labeling accuracy (as intuitively one’s answer is compared to
a random guess. So there is no reason to exert effort in such a case, regardless of workers’ realized costs.) This requirement can
be relaxed by considering the fact a 0 < β < 1 fraction of workers is independent of the collusion.
The second place that such an assumption is needed is in bounding the estimation errors (when use the mean value theorem,
we need a bounded graident). We hope to find other bounds to get around of the requirement pL > 0.5.
F Performance for (SPP PostPrice) under non-game theoretical model
Theorem 10. When run (SPP PostPrice) for the non-game theoretical model, R(T ) is bounded as:
R(T ) ≤ O(⌈T θ+z logT ⌉) + 2C(θ)L1( 2
(2pL − 1)2 +
1
2pL − 1)T
1−θ/2 + L2T 1−z + const.
Proof. Similar with the proof for Theorem 8, we are going to bound a number of estimation errors in evaluating U(·). First of
all notice at time t,
|
∑
i∈Gg(i) p
i
m(Bk)
|Gg(i)|
−
∑
i∈Gg(i) p˜
i
m(Bk)
|Gg(i)|
| ≤
∑
i∈Gg(i)
|pim(Bk)− p˜im(Bk)|/|Gg(i)|.
Again when the algorithm enters exploitation phases (so D(t) number of samples guaranteed for all arms) we have ∀k by
Chernoff bound that
Pr
[
|pim(Bk)− p˜im(Bk)| ≥ tθ/2
]
≤ 2/t2,
Then via union bound we know with probability being at least 1− N+1t2 (∀i):
|
∑
i∈Gg(i) p
i
m(Bk)
|Gg(i)|
−
∑
i∈Gg(i) p˜
i
m(Bk)
|Gg(i)|
| ≤ t−θ/2.
Then we know the following holds:
|p˜i,t(Bk)− pi(Bk)|
≤ |p
i
m(Bk) + p¯(Bk)− 1
2p˜t(Bk)− 1 − pi(Bk)|+ |
pim,t(Bk)− pim(Bk) + p˜t(Bk)− p¯(Bk)
2p˜t(B)− 1 |
≤ |p
i
m(Bk) + p¯(Bk)− 1
2p˜(Bk)− 1 − p
i(Bk)|+ 2t
−θ/2
2pL − 1
≤ 2p
i
m(Bk) + p¯(Bk)− 1
(2pL − 1)2 |p˜t(Bk)− p¯(Bk)|+
2t−θ/2
2pL − 1
≤ 2
(2pL − 1)2
L1 · t−θ/2
2
√
2pL − 1 +
2
2pL − 1 t
−θ/2
=
t−θ/2
2pL − 1(
L1
(2pL − 1)1.5 + 2) .
The second inequality uses the concentration bound, as well as the fact that p¯(B) ≥ pL > 12 , ∀B so that the estimation should
never go smaller than this quantity. The third inequality applies mean value theorem to function 1/(2x− 1); while the last one
uses fact |pim(Bk) + p¯(Bk) − 1| < 1 and concentration bound. Then for any B, we have the estimated utility function U˜(B)
satisfy the follows
|U˜(B)− U(B)| ≤L1 t
−θ/2
2pL − 1(
L1
(2pL − 1)1.5 + 2) .
The rest of analysis is very similar to the one we presented for Theorem 8. We will not re-state the derivation details, but we are
led to:
U(B∗t )− U(B∗) ≥ −L1
t−θ/2
2pL − 1(
L1
(2pL − 1)1.5 + 2)− L2B¯ · T
−z .
And the exploitation regret accumulated up to time t is bounded by
∑
t
(
L1
t−θ/2
2pL − 1(
L1
(2pL − 1)1.5 + 2) + L2B¯ · T
−z
)
+ const. ≤ C(θ)L1
2pL − 1(
L1
(2pL − 1)1.5 + 2)T
1−θ/2 + L2C(z)T 1−z + const.
And the exploration regret is upper bounded as O(T zD(t)) = O(T z+θ log T ).
